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Rising international bank financing to developing countries has motivated a debate on the 
behavior of these claims. We analyze claims from seven home (lender) countries on ten host 
(borrower) countries in Latin America. We find that banks transmit shocks from their home 
countries and changes in their claims on other countries spill over to individual hosts. However, 
lending has become less “indiscriminate” and more responsive to host conditions over time. 
Responsiveness to the latter becomes less “pro-cyclical” as exposure increases. Finally, foreign 
bank lending reacts more to positive than to negative host shocks and is not significantly 
curtailed during crises. 
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Banking on Foreigners: 
The Behavior of International Bank Lending to Latin America, 1985-2000 
 
Over the last decade, foreign bank lending to developing countries has risen significantly.  
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), by the end of 2000, international bank 
claims -the sum of direct (cross-border) foreign bank lending plus locally funded claims in 
foreign currency- to the non-bank private sector in developing countries reached a record 421.2 
billion dollars, up from 112.2 billion dollars in 1985.
1  To put this figure in perspective, this sum 
represents 13 percent of total private sector credit in the developing world.
2 The relative 
importance of international bank claims is larger for countries in Latin America and in 
developing Europe, where by the end of 2000, they averaged 40 percent of private sector credit.
3  
The importance of foreign bank lending in developing economies has stimulated a lively 
debate on the stability of such claims. One view is that foreign banks can be a reliable source of 
credit as, relative to domestic banks, they are less dependent on flighty local deposits and can tap 
a more stable, diversified international pool of liquidity. The alternative view is that foreign 
banks are unstable, transmitting shocks from their home countries or from other countries to 
which they lend, and pulling out at the first sign of trouble in host (borrower) countries. 
A number of recent studies have shed light on the behavior of foreign banks.  Peek and 
Rosengren (2000a) find that Japanese bank lending to the U.S. was strongly affected by 
                                                            
1 International bank claims refer to the BIS definition of consolidated international claims of BIS reporting banks 
(internationally active banks in BIS reporting countries) which includes all claims funded in a BIS reporting country 
but lent in a developing country and claims funded and lent in a developing country in foreign currency through a 
BIS reporting bank.  BIS reporting countries in 2000 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and US. 
2 Private sector credit refers to credit provided by banks operating in the developing world (both foreign and 
domestic). Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
3 While impressive, these figures are likely to underestimate overall foreign bank lending to developing countries 
since the BIS figures on international claims to the private sector encompass cross-border lending plus local lending 
in foreign currency, but exclude local lending in local currency. 2 
economic events in Japan that, in turn, affected the U.S. commercial real estate sector.  Focusing 
on the behavior of U.S. bank claims (cross-border and locally funded) on a number of regions 
including Latin America since the mid-1980s, Goldberg (2001) finds that U.S. economic 
conditions impacted U.S. bank foreign lending.  However, she also finds that U.S. bank foreign 
lending was unaffected by economic conditions in host (borrower) countries and that U.S. banks 
did not retrench their lending significantly following international financial crises.  Dages et al. 
(2000) focus on the local lending behavior of all foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico over the 
late 1990s. They argue that foreign bank penetration did not increase financial sector instability 
by showing that foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico exhibited stronger and less volatile loan 
growth than domestic banks between 1994 and 1999, i.e. during and after the Tequila crisis.  
Peek and Rosengren (2000b) reach a similar conclusion by examining the behavior of direct (or 
cross-border) foreign lending and local claims from foreign banks on Argentina, Mexico, and 
Brazil over the period 1994-1999. Finally, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) examine a panel 
of BIS data on flows to 30 emerging markets disaggregated by 11 banking centers, to test the 
role of bank lending in transmitting currency crises. They find that bank exposures to a crisis 
country help predict bank flows in third countries after the Asian crisis, and to a lesser extent the 
Mexican 1994 crisis. 
  The papers discussed above make specific contributions to the debate regarding the 
behavior of foreign banks.  However, each study concentrates on a narrow set of issues and/or 
covers a limited number of home (lender) and host (borrower) countries. In this study, we 
employ a comprehensive data set on international bank claims across a wide range of home and 
host countries over a fifteen year period to revisit some of the issues examined by previous 
studies, and to explore questions that have not been investigated previously.  Our dataset, 
                                                            
 
 3 
provided by the BIS, covers international bank claims from the seven most important lenders to 
Latin America (i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.) on the non-
bank private sector in the ten largest borrowers in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), over the period 1985-2000.
4 
We focus our study on Latin America for a number of reasons. First, foreign banks have 
had an active presence in this region since the beginning of our sample and, as noted above, it is 
now one of the regions with the highest foreign bank participation. Second, while for the region 
as a whole foreign bank lending has increased in recent years, there are still differences in the 
extent to which countries depend on this source of funds. For example, international bank 
lending (cross-border or direct foreign lending and local lending in foreign currency) in 2000 
represented more than 55 percent of domestic credit for Argentina and Peru, but it only 
accounted for 19 percent of domestic credit for Brazil. Third, the region has experienced 
considerable shocks (positive and negative) during the period of study. Therefore, we think that 
Latin America’s experience over the last 15 years offers a unique opportunity to analyze the 
determinants of foreign bank lending. 
Using this dataset on international bank lending, we attempt to address a wider set of 
issues than previous studies regarding foreign bank behavior and the ‘stability’ of their claims.  
In particular, we seek to answer questions like: (1) do foreign banks transmit shocks from their 
home countries? (2) Do portfolio adjustments spill over to individual host countries? (3) How do 
foreign banks respond to positive and negative shocks? (4) Do foreign banks retrench their 
lending during crises in host countries? (5) How does the level of exposure affect banks' 
responsiveness to shocks in host countries and, in particular, do banks become more or less pro-
cyclical as exposure levels rise? (6) Do increases in local presence by foreign banks (through 
                                                            
4 The data on the sectoral breakdown of lending by banks in specific BIS countries to individual borrower countries 4 
brick and mortar operations) affect their reaction to home and host shocks?  (7) Is the 
responsiveness of foreign banks to different types of shocks similar across lenders?  
In examining the determinants of foreign bank lending we include not only standard 
home and host country variables (like growth rates, risk ratings, and interest rates), but also we 
test for the significance of other factors.  For example, models of portfolio allocation show that 
under standard rules of portfolio choice an unexpected decline in the value of one or more assets 
may provoke a portfolio adjustment across the board.
 5 Applying this result to our context, some 
shocks might then result in an ‘indiscriminate’ change in the claims on a particular host country 
and a positive relation between changes in the whole international lending portfolio and changes 
in claims on any one country. To examine the impact of overall international portfolio changes 
on the claims to an individual host country, we include as an explanatory variable the change in 
claims to all countries other than that individual host.  
We also investigate whether the extent and type of exposure to a particular country is 
important in explaining the change in claims.  One view might be that the greater the exposure of 
an international bank to a particular country, the more pro-cyclical its lending behavior might 
become.  This might be the case for example for a bank that is not highly diversified.  However, 
an alternative view is that as a bank’s exposure to a country grows, the bank has more incentives 
to learn about the home country conditions and hence not to respond so strongly to noisy signals 
of good or bad future events
6.  We investigate the role of exposure on the responsiveness to 
shocks in two ways. First, we interact host growth, changes in host risk ratings, and the indicator 
for crises in host countries with a measure of bank exposure to test whether lenders that are 
                                                            
 
is confidential and was provided to us by the BIS with explicit authorization from each of the relevant central banks. 
5 See Schinasi and Smith (1999). 
6 For example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argue that as investors become more diversified, and hence their average 
exposures in any particular asset decrease, they have reduced incentives to learn about the fundamentals of each 5 
highly exposed to a country react less to domestic shocks in that country. Second, because in the 
second half of the 1990s there was an increase in brick and mortar operations of foreign banks in 
Latin America, we examine whether there are differences in the behavior of foreign banks over 
time, as the nature of their exposure to this region changed. 
Finally, we incorporate specifications that allow us to test for two types of asymmetries 
in the responsiveness of foreign bank lending to shocks. First, we test whether all lenders 
respond similarly to shocks by testing whether it is valid to pool across lenders. Secondly, we 
allow the reaction of foreign banks to shocks to depend on whether these are positive or 
negative. 
Our empirical estimations allow us to corroborate, for a larger combination of home and 
host countries, over a relative long period of time, some of the results found by other studies. In 
particular, like Peek and Rosengren (2000a) and Goldberg (2001), we find that home country 
conditions (i.e., conditions in the country where foreign banks’ headquarters reside) are 
important in explaining changes in private sector claims. Also, consistent with other studies we 
find that foreign bank lending does not retrench during crises in the host countries (see Dages et 
al. (2000), Peek and Rosengren (2000b), Goldberg (2001)).  
More importantly, our work yields interesting new results. First, while foreign banks 
across lender countries appear to react similarly to host country shocks, the magnitude of their 
reaction to shocks in their own countries is different. Second, lending to individual host countries 
is positively associated with changes in claims to all other countries. Third, the higher the overall 
exposure of home country banks to a given host country, the less responsive are those banks’ 
claims to host country shocks. Fourth, as brick and mortar operations become more important 
                                                            
 
asset and hence react more strongly to ‘signals’ on expected return or risk.  This suggests that as foreign banks 
become more exposed to a particular host country, they react less to changes in host country variables.  6 
over time, foreign banks’ reaction to external and portfolio shocks is diminished. Finally, we 
uncover asymmetries regarding foreign banks’ response to positive and negative shocks, given 
that banks appear to respond more to the former than to the latter. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the data used in this 
paper. Section III presents the empirical methodology. Section IV describes the empirical results. 
Finally, Section V concludes.  
 
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Foreign banks provide financing to developing countries in at least two ways. First, they 
provide direct (or cross-border) financing from their headquarters and affiliates outside the 
developing world. Second, they establish operations (branches and subsidiaries) in developing 
countries and provide financing with local funding.  In this paper we analyze the behavior of 
‘international bank (or financial) claims’ on the non-bank private sector as defined by the BIS.
7  
In other words, our main variable of study includes direct foreign lending (from outside host 
countries to local institutions) in any currency plus local claims in foreign currency from 
subsidiaries or branches of BIS reporting banks from seven home countries (i.e., Canada, France, 
Japan, Germany, Spain, UK, and US) to the ten largest economies in Latin America (namely, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela) over the period 1985-2000. Claims extended from a local subsidiary or branch but 
funded by another part of the same BIS reporting bank, located outside of the host country, are 
consolidated. The principal balance sheet items included in the claims that we study are loans 
                                                            
7 For a full description of this data see the BIS “Guide to International Banking Statistics”, July 2000. 7 
and advances to the private sector as well as holdings of securities and participations.
8  The data 
frequency is annual. 
This definition of foreign lending represents a compromise. On the one hand, we might 
have chosen to work with a narrower definition including only the direct foreign lending from 
outside our host countries.  However, this would have left out completely the growing trend of 
foreign banks investing in brick and mortar operations in our host countries and extending loans 
locally.  On the other hand, we could have attempted to include all local claims including those 
funded in local currency.   
Unfortunately, the BIS does not report data on local claims in local currency to the non-
bank private sector (it only reports total local claims in local currency including those to the 
public sector). Furthermore, there are a number of reasons why including these claims might not 
be appropriate.  First, it is not clear how much such claims add to the ‘exposure’ of a foreign 
bank.  Local currency deposits that fund local lending of foreign banks’ brick and mortar 
operations can be thought of as a hedge against currency and possibly even against sovereign 
risks.  Second, we wish to focus on those aspects of foreign bank operations that are distinct. The 
local currency operations of foreign banks are the operations most likely to resemble those of 
local banks. As we are interested in assessing the behavior of banks that are characterized by 
access to an international pool of liquidity, including claims extended in local currency does not 
appear appropriate for that goal.  For these reasons, we adopt ‘international financial (or bank) 
claims’ as a reasonable measure of foreign bank lending and note that this definition has 
moreover become something of a standard in the industry
9 
                                                            
8 Claims are not adjusted to consider guarantees and collateral. While at first hand this might seem to overestimate 
the exposure that banks have to certain countries, it is not clear that the quality of the collateral and guarantees can 
be compared across countries. Therefore, it is not obvious that greater guarantees in a country with poor legal 
systems translate into less exposure relative to other countries where such guarantees are not offered. 
9 It might also be argued that local foreign currency deposits are more likely to be owned by non-residents and hence 
should be included as part of the ‘international pool of liquidity’ available to foreign banks whereas local currency 8 
Also, due to a number of factors we limit our study to claims on the non-bank private 
sector as opposed to total claims.
10  First, we want to abstract from political or strategic 
considerations that might affect lending to governments. Second, it is likely that while the vast 
majority of private sector claims are loans, claims on the public sector are mostly more liquid 
bonds. End of year stocks for the latter may then not necessarily be representative of exposure 
and the BIS data does not control well for credit risk mitigation techniques such as derivatives.  
While this might also be a problem for private sector claims, we feel that this problem is 
minimized in this case. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of real claims to the non-bank private sector from banks in 
the seven BIS-reporting lender countries to the ten borrowing countries in Latin America. 
Following the debt crisis in Latin America, claims to the region declined in real terms between 
1985 and 1990. However, over the 1990s, real claims rebounded rising rapidly and surpassing 
the 100 billion dollars mark by the end of the decade. As a percentage of Latin America’s 
domestic private credit, the importance of foreign bank financing from the seven BIS-reporting 
countries declined over the second half of the 1980s (see Figure 2). However, between 1990 and 
2000, the ratio of private sector claims from banks in the seven BIS-reporting countries to private 
sector credit in Latin America rose from 12 to 28 percent. 
Figure 3 illustrates the exposure of BIS reporting banks from the seven home reporting 
countries to Latin America. In the early to mid-1980s, claims to Latin America accounted for 
more than one third of the overall portfolio of international financial claims of the seven BIS-
reporting countries. As a result of the debt crisis, foreign banks diversified away from the region 
                                                            
 
local claims/deposits are less likely to be owned by non-residents.  Finally, it is also worth noting that, although the 
local currency local claims of BIS reporting banks have been growing in Latin America, they remain well below 50 
percent of total foreign claims (i.e., total claims to the private and public sector) and so adopting the definition of 
international financial claims as described in the text captures the majority of foreign bank lending operations. 9 
over the second half of the 1980s. Over the last decade, exposure to Latin America has remained 
below the 1980s levels, but has risen steadily over time, reaching 17 percent in 2000. 
Among the individual countries in Latin America, as expected, the largest economies in 
the region attract most of the international bank claims (see Figure 4). On average between 1985 
and 2000, Brazil received 27 percent of all foreign bank claims directed to the non-bank private 
sector in the region. Mexico received 25 percent of such claims and Argentina 21 percent. Both 
Chile and Venezuela accounted for less than 10 percent of these claims. 
  Figure 5 illustrates the importance of the individual home country bank lenders to the 
region. Among the seven top lending countries to the region, the U.S., France, Germany and 
recently, Spain have been the most important sources of funds throughout the sample.  The U.S. 
has been the most consistent lender to the region, accounting for more than 20 percent of all 
claims to the non-bank private sector in this region throughout the entire period 1985-2000. 
German lending to Latin America has hovered between 20 and 15 percent of all lending to this 
region. While French banks accounted for more than 35 percent of all lending to Latin America 
in 1990, this figure dropped to less than 15 percent in the year 2000. Spain has emerged as the 
lender with the fastest growing share of claims to this region, accounting for less than 5 percent 
of claims in 1985 but exceeding 20 percent of total claims to the non-bank private sector in 2000. 
  Figure 6 shows the exposure of foreign banks from BIS reporting countries to Latin 
America (i.e., the ratio of claims by each lender to the region over total international claims for 
each lender) over the period 1985-2000. Throughout this period, Spain and the U.S. were the 
lenders with the highest exposure to this region. Spanish exposure averaged 50 percent of its 
total international private claims, while for the U.S. this figure was 35 percent. However, the 
                                                            
 
10 The BIS also gathers data on claims on banks, however, we focus on non-bank claims because the former include 
claims on the official monetary authorities and on public banks and we want to study private sector claims.  10 
trend in exposure across these two countries is very different. While U.S. exposure has remained 
fairly constant throughout the period 1985-2000, Spanish exposure has increased significantly 
from less than 40 percent in the early 1990s to more than 68 percent by 2000.   
Having described the pattern and importance of foreign bank lending to Latin America, 
Table 1 and 2 provide some descriptive statistics to illustrate the stability of this source of 
financing vis-à-vis real domestic credit.
11 Table 1 compares the growth of international bank 
claims and of domestic credit during tranquil and crisis periods in the host countries. The latter 
refer to banking, currency or twin crises.
12  
According to Table 1, both international and domestic credit decline during host country 
crises, but while the average growth of BIS lenders’ claims on Latin America remains positive, 
real domestic changes are, on average, negative.
13 At the same time, neither foreign nor domestic 
credit seems to have declined significantly (when compared to tranquil periods) during recent 
international crises outside the host countries we focus on. Furthermore, Table 2 explicitly 
compares the behavior of international bank claims against real domestic credit. This table shows 
that domestic credit growth exhibits significantly higher volatility  (as measured by the standard 
deviation of changes in credit) than claims from BIS reporting banks in these seven home 
countries, both during host crisis, and during tranquil periods.
14 There is some evidence of 
transmission of portfolio shocks: the volatility of BIS claims is higher than the volatility of 
domestic credit during the Asian crisis, although as can be seen from Table 1 only the U.S. 
reduced its claims on Latin America during that period.  In fact, when we consider the Russian 
                                                            
11 See footnote 2.  
12 Table A.1 lists these episodes for each of the ten Latin American countries in our sample and provides the 
definition and sources used to identify them.  
13 Rather than comparing the behavior of domestic credit vis-à-vis foreign lending during all types of crises 
combined, Table A.2 reports similar statistics distinguishing between  currency, banking, and twin crises. In terms of 
percentages, domestic credit falls by more, on average, than foreign bank lending during banking and twin crises. 
The reverse is true during currency crises. However, as shown in Table A.3, these differences in means are not 
statistically significant.  11 
crisis episode, the volatility of BIS claims is significantly lower than the volatility of domestic 
credit.  In general these statistics suggest that there is no systematic evidence that international 
financial claims are less “stable” than credit originated locally.   However, this is only partial and 
descriptive evidence and needs to be verified with a more careful empirical approach, which we 
undertake next. 
 
III. Empirical Methodology 
In this section we discuss the econometric model that we employ to analyze the behavior 
of foreign bank lending.  In particular, we draw on previous literature on international bank 
behavior and on the extensive literature on capital flows that estimates reduced form models that 
consider both home (lender) or pull and host (borrower) or push variables.
15  However, we also 
add variables motivated by recent theory.  In particular, we add extra variables to investigate the 
role of portfolio shocks as well as the impact of exposure on banks’ responsiveness to shocks. 
Hence the general econometric model can be represented as follows
16: 
) 1 ( ) aims Oprivatecl (% ) Exposure * Factors Host (
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where j=1 to 7 identifies banks from each of the seven BIS home (lender) countries, i=1 to 10 
indicates each individual Latin American host (borrower) country and t=1985 to 2000 refers to 
                                                            
 
14 Table A.3 shows that the volatility of domestic credit is statistically higher than that of foreign bank lending for 
currency and twin crises. 
15 See Goldberg (2001), Peek and Rosengren (2000a) on banks and see Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), 
Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1998), Fernandez-Aries (1996), and Hernandez, Mellado, and Valdes (2001) on 
capital flows.  
16 Alternatively, we could estimate a separate regression for each home (lender) country, using Zellner’s Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions method, to account for contemporaneous cross-equation correlation in the error terms. As a 
robustness check, we estimated  separate equations for each lender and compared those results to the results from 
estimating Equation 1.  The differences are not significant, and, furthermore, the drawback to the SUR method is 
that it forces our data into a balanced panel, significantly reducing the number of observations. 12 
the time period considered.
17 %
j
t i Claims , ∆  is the percentage change in real claims from banks in 
home country j to the private non-bank sector in host country i between t-1 and t. As explained 
above, we use consolidated international financial claims as defined and supplied by the Bank 
for International Settlements.   
Among the host country variables, we include the real GDP growth, the change in 
country risk rating, and a crisis indicator. Growth figures come from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics. The credit rating we include is reported by Institutional Investor 
Magazine.
18,19  The crisis indicator is a dummy variable which equals one if host country i had a 
crisis (banking, currency, or both) in a given period. A chronology of crises in the region was 
obtained from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Bordo et al. (2001).
20 We interact these 
variables with a measure of exposure to examine the responsiveness to host shocks as exposure 
increases. Exposure represents the ratio of country j claims on country i over the total claims 
extended by country j. This ratio is calculated from the BIS consolidated banking statistics. 
Finally, because foreign bank claims are reported in dollars, we also control for changes in the 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar for each home and host country. 
In principle, given the importance of foreign lending to the region, changes in such 
claims could affect host country right hand side variables (e.g.: host real GDP growth, timing of 
crises, and credit rating) implying a potential endogeneity problem. We believe that the concern 
regarding endogeneity is perhaps overstated since our estimations focus on bilateral lending 
                                                            
17 The U.K. is the exception where data on private sector claims are only available for the period 1993-2000. 
18 Institutional Investor Magazine publishes a semi-annual survey of country credit ratings. The magazine surveys 
bankers, money managers, and economists around the world on their evaluations of the relative risk of countries to 
which they lend. On the basis of their responses, they produce a rating from 0 to 100, with higher numbers 
representing a better repayment capacity. 
19 In alternative specifications that are not shown but are available upon request we replace the credit risk rating for a 
number of macro variables (government deficit, current account deficit, real exchange rate appreciation, among 
others) that serve as proxies for country risk. Given that results were very similar, we prefer this more parsimonious 
specification.  
20 See Table A.1 for a list of crises in each host country during 1985-2000. 13 
flows (i.e., changes in real claims from home country j on host country i) and no bilateral 
relationship seems important enough to warrant such concern. Tables A.4 and A.5 in the 
Appendix illustrate that when expressed as either a percentage of domestic credit or as a 
percentage of total BIS lending to each host, these bilateral lending shares are relatively small. 
Nonetheless, as a precaution, all right hand side variables are lagged one period. 
Home real GDP growth and real interest rates are included to control for home country 
shocks. Both of these variables come from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Finally, 
∆Oprivateclaims
 j
t-1 is the lagged change in private claims from banks in country j to all (non-
BIS reporting) countries other than i between period t-1 and t. This variable is calculated on the 
basis of the BIS consolidated banking statistics and is intended to examine the impact of 
spillover effects from portfolio changes in other countries. 





and allows the coefficients to vary depending on the home country or lender (this explains the j 
superscript in all coefficients).
21 However, it is possible that different lenders react similarly to 
host and even home country shocks. Below, we test different restricted versions of equation (1) 
to arrive at a final specification that constrains the impact of certain variables to be the same 
across home and host countries. 
Home country economic conditions could have both a negative or positive impact on 
foreign bank lending to host countries. On the one hand, adverse economic conditions and a lack 
of profit opportunities at home could encourage banks to lend abroad. If this were the case, we 
would expect to find a negative coefficient on home growth. On the other hand, a recession at 
home could lead to a deterioration in the capital of foreign banks and an overall retrenchment in 
lending at home and abroad.  We therefore remain agnostic regarding the sign of this variable.  14 
While we are interested in whether our results are in line with those obtained by other 
researchers, given our cross-country dataset and analysis we are also interested in whether 
different home country banks behave in a similar fashion or not with respect to home growth.  
Low real interest rates in lender countries tend to signal periods of excess liquidity and 
portfolio theory would suggest that this would increase banks’ willingness to lend via riskier, 
higher interest rate loans to developing countries. During these episodes, foreign banks are more 
likely to search for lending opportunities abroad. Therefore, we expect home real interest rates to 
have a negative impact on the change in claims. 
Foreign banks are less likely to extend credit abroad if the riskiness of the host country 
worsens. An increase in risk (lower host growth or a rating downgrade) should then lead to a 
rebalancing within the loan portfolio away from the affected country. Hence, we expect to find a 
positive coefficient on growth and rating. 
A priori, we might expect banking, currency, and/or twin crisis episodes in a particular 
host country to be accompanied by a decline in foreign bank lending, since these episodes are 
typically associated with a fall in the capacity of crises-stricken countries to repay their 
obligations. On the other hand, foreign banks might view crises in host countries as an 
opportunity to expand their operations and increase their market share locally. Also, crises might 
coincide with a deterioration in economic fundamentals like GDP growth making their impact 
indistinguishable from other cyclical downturns. In other words, it is possible that the crisis 
dummy in our regressions may not be significant because the impact of these episodes is being 
captured by changes in GDP growth. This in turn would suggest that crises are not perceived as 
different from any other cyclical downturn in output. 
                                                            
 
21 We could have also allowed coefficients to vary by host country i but since host country dummies were not 
individually significant we decided against this. 15 
As we discussed above, shocks to the value of an asset or assets within the lending 
portfolio of foreign banks, may result in a reduction (or increase, depending on the type of 
shock) across all risky claims.  Adapting this idea to our application, we should then find a 
positive and significant coefficient relating the change in claims on country i from country j 
banks to the change in all other claims of country j banks. 
Following Calvo and Mendoza (2000), if country j banks have a higher exposure to 
country i, then they should have greater incentives to learn and hence should provide more stable 
financing.  To test this proposition, we interact the host country variables (the change in rating, 
the real growth, and the crisis indicator for host country i, respectively) with the exposure of 
country j banks to country i. A priori, if indeed higher exposure is translated into more stable 
financing, we expect these interaction terms to be opposite in sign to that of the host country 
shock. For example, we expect the interaction between host growth (or changes in host rating) 
and exposure to be negative and the interaction between host crisis and exposure to be positive. 
  To deepen our understanding of the determinants of foreign bank lending, we estimate 
some modified versions of equation (1). First, we examine whether banks’ responsiveness to 
shocks depends on the type of shock by allowing the coefficients in equation (1) to vary 
depending on whether the change in host real GDP, host rating, and the change in all other 
claims is positive or negative
22. Also, because in the late 1990s, foreign banks increased their 
lending on-shore relative to the previous decade and this might have affected how banks respond 
to home and host shocks, we estimate equation (1) over both sub-samples (1985-94) and (1995-
2000) and examine whether banks’ responsiveness to home and host variables changed over this 
period. 
                                                            
22 We do not investigate positive/negative home growth shocks, because for the seven home countries we focus on, 
there have been virtually no years in which home growth has been negative. 16 
  Finally, in order to summarize the importance of home country, host country, and 
portfolio shocks, we report for each estimation the percentage of the variance of claims 
explained by each of these factors. To the extent that home country and portfolio shocks, 
dominate host country shocks, we would be inclined to conclude that foreign banks facilitate the 
transmission of external shocks. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
  Table 3 presents the unrestricted version of equation (1), where the coefficients on all 
variables are allowed to differ across home or lender countries. In general, all banks respond 
positively to improvements in host country economic conditions, such as an increase in real GDP 
growth and an upgrade in the credit risk rating. In particular, these factors are significant in the 
case of Japan, Spain, and the U.S.. Also, foreign banks tend to increase their lending abroad 
when opportunities at home dwindle. This is illustrated by the negative sign on home growth 
across all lenders, except Japan. Home growth is negative and statistically significant for France 
and the US. Tighter monetary conditions at home result in less lending abroad, as shown by the 
negative coefficients on home real interest rates. Yet, this variable appears to be significant only 
for Japan. Like Goldberg (2001), we find that controlling for other factors reflecting host 
economic conditions, crises in host countries do not lead to reductions in lending across the 
board. The sign on this coefficient varies depending on the lender or home country, but this 
variable is never significant. In general, a shock to the rest of the portfolio is transmitted to 
individual host countries in Latin America. This is illustrated by the positive coefficient on all 
other claims. Finally, it seems that in general, the higher the exposure of a lender to a given host 
country, the smaller the reaction to host country shocks, as evidenced by the mostly negative 
coefficient on the interaction terms between host growth and host credit rating with exposure.  17 
A cursory look at the results from the unrestricted model suggests that banks in home or 
lender countries respond similarly to certain shocks, not just in sign but also in magnitude. Thus, 
Table 4, reports F-tests for a number of cross-lender restrictions. To summarize, we find that 
banks in home or lender countries respond similarly to host country shocks, exchange rate 
changes, and portfolio shocks. In other words, we cannot reject the joint hypotheses that the 
coefficients on host growth, on the interaction between host growth and exposure, on the change 
in ratings, on the interaction between change in ratings and exposure, on the crisis dummy, on 
the interaction between crisis and exposure, and finally, on the host country dummies are the 
same across home or lender countries. Furthermore, we also cannot reject the hypothesis that 
exchange rate changes affect all lenders in the same way. 
   Table 5 shows the results from estimating the selected restricted model (i.e., model (4.3) 
in Table 4) for the overall sample 1985-2000 and for the sub-samples 1985-94 and 1995-2000.  
The first column of Table 5 (model 5.1) presents our preferred model for the whole sample 
period.  Focusing on the subset of home country (j) variables, we find that France, Germany, 
Spain, the UK, and the U.S. reduce claims in response to increased profit opportunities at home 
(i.e., in response to higher home growth), but only the coefficient on U.S. home growth is 
significant with a negative sign. Home growth has a positive and significant effect for Canada 
and Japan. With the exception of Germany and the UK, the home real interest rate has the 
expected negative impact. This variable is statistically significant for Canada, Japan, and the US.   
Among the subset of host country variables, we find that the coefficient on host growth is 
positive and significant, showing support for the idea that foreign banks do respond to host 
country growth, increasing and decreasing credit over the cycle.  However, we also find strong 
support for a “Calvo-Mendoza” effect, such that the higher the exposure of home country j to 
host country i, the less pro-cyclical (the less sensitive to host growth) is foreign bank lending. 18 
The coefficient on host credit rating is positive and significant, while the interaction term of 
rating with exposure is negative, but not significant.  Controlling for host country growth and 
risk rating, the crisis variable is not significant. Therefore, it does not appear that crisis episodes 
cause any further decline in foreign bank claims.
23  Finally, the coefficient on private claims on 
other countries is positive and significant, indicating that changes elsewhere in the portfolio of 
lending banks might affect individual host countries. 
Between 1985-2000, foreign bank penetration (the participation of foreign banks in the 
local banking market) in Latin America increased significantly. Indeed while locally funded 
foreign bank loans (in local or foreign currency) accounted for some 15 percent of total lending 
by banks operating in the region in 1995, this figure had risen to 38 percent by 2000
24. We 
investigate whether the responsiveness of foreign banks changed as their brick and mortar 
investment (or local claims) in these countries increase by comparing the estimates of our model 
over the two sub-samples, namely, 1985-94 and 1995-2000. 
Over the period 1985-1994, host real growth plays a significant role in explaining 
movements in real claims. While the coefficient on home country real interest rates remains 
negative and significant, there is not much evidence that claims respond to home growth.  The 
coefficient on the dummy variable capturing crises in the host country appears large and 
negative, but is insignificant.
25   Finally, the coefficient on the change in real claims on all other 
countries is both positive and significant indicating that changes in claims on specific host 
countries are affected by across the board changes in the international portfolio. 
                                                            
23 This result is independent of whether we include the crisis dummy contemporaneously instead of lagged (see 
Table A.6) and it also holds when we discriminate between banking, currency, and twin crises (see Table A.7). 
24 Salomon Smith Barney (2000). 
25 This result continues to hold over the period 1985-1994 even when we include the crisis dummy 
contemporaneously or if we include separate dummies to identify banking, currency, and twin crises (see Tables A.6 
and A.7). 19 
Over the period 1995-2000, which coincides with the increase in brick and mortar 
operations of foreign banks in the region, we find that banks do not seem to pull out from host 
countries in crises. The coefficient on the crisis dummy is smaller in magnitude, and also 
insignificant.
26  Also, over this period, in contrast to the findings for the previous period, there is 
no significant evidence that changes in claims to other countries are transmitted to the host 
countries we focus on. Changes in credit ratings have a positive and significant impact on foreign 
bank lending, but foreign banks’ responsiveness to this variable decreases as the degree of 
exposure rises. 
Not only is it possible that foreign banks respond differently to home and host country 
economic conditions as the type of exposure to the region changes, but it is also feasible that 
their reaction depends asymmetrically on the nature of the shocks.  In order to test this formally, 
we discriminate between positive and negative changes in host GDP growth, host credit ratings, 
and in all other claims.
27  Table 6 presents the results from this estimation for the overall sample, 
1985-2000. Note that we define negative changes in absolute terms so that we can interpret a 
negative coefficient as stating that larger drops in the variable in question lead to a decline in the 
growth of claims. 
The results in Table 6 have some interesting interpretations.  Specifically we find that 
while positive changes in host real GDP growth continue to have a positive and significant sign, 
the coefficient on negative host GDP growth is negative but not significant. The same is true for 
credit ratings:  claims respond to upgrades and not to downgrades in credit ratings.  However, the 
higher the exposure to the host country, the smaller the response of claims to upgrades in credit 
ratings, as indicated by the significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term between 
                                                            
26 As with the findings for the overall sample and the pre-1995 period, the results do not change if we enter the crisis 
dummy contemporaneously or if we analyze the impact of banking, currency, and twin crises, separately (see Tables 
A.6 and A.7). 
 20 
upgrades and exposure.  On the other hand, both positive and negative changes in other country 
claims are statistically significant; negative changes have a much stronger impact on private 
claims than do positive changes, and that difference is statistically significant at standard 
significance levels.   One interpretation of these results is that banks are more discriminate in the 
‘good times’ than in the ‘bad times’.  In other words, during periods of positive growth, banks 
appear to increase claims more related to individual host country growth performance whereas in 
periods of negative growth, banks seem to retrench lending more across the board than in 
accordance with individual country factors.
28 
A useful way of summarizing the importance of home, host, and portfolio shocks is 
provided in Table 7, which details the percentage of the variance in private claims explained by 
each of these groups of variables. In other words, for each group of variables, we compute the 
increase in the R-squared, as a proportion of the total variance of the percentage change in claims 
explained by all variables. We rescale the percentage explained by each group of variables so 
that the sum of all three adds to 100. 
We find that while changes in claims on all other countries explain a significant amount 
of the variance in the dependent variable (21%) in the 1985-1994 period, they practically play no 
role in explaining changes in private sector claims on host countries in Latin America during the 
later period.   In addition, while home country conditions explain a large proportion (62%) of the 
variance in private claims during the 1985-1994 sub-period, their importance declines 
significantly in the latest sub-period.  Host country conditions explain between 20 and 50 percent 
of the variance in claims in both periods, and, overwhelmingly, it is positive changes (positive 
                                                            
 
27 See footnote 22.  
28 One possible interpretation of this result is that investors facing margin calls when a negative shock takes place in  
a particular country  might engage in an indiscriminate reduction in their international portfolio. We thank Enrique 
Mendoza for this observation. 21 
growth and credit rating upgrades) that play the most significant role in explaining the changes in 
international financial claims. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we employ a comprehensive dataset to address a number of questions 
related to the stability of foreign bank claims.  The data set is rich in two dimensions. From a 
cross-sectional perspective, we capture the behavior of banks from different home countries.  
Banks from these countries vary in both their degree of exposure and in their importance as a 
source of credit to Latin America and to the particular host countries we analyze. From a time-
series perspective, our dataset allows us to focus on periods of tranquility as well as periods of 
crisis; on periods of lower foreign bank penetration and periods of strong “mortar and brick” 
(local) presence. With this more general dataset, we confirm particular previous findings in the 
literature, but more importantly we offer a set of new results. 
In particular, we find that banks transmit shocks from their home countries and changes 
in their claims on other countries spill over to individual hosts. However, both the regression 
results and the variance decompositions over the sub-periods 1985-1994 and 1995-2000 indicate 
that foreign bank lending has become less “indiscriminate” and more responsive to host 
conditions over time. The responsiveness to the latter becomes less “pro-cyclical” as exposure 
increases. Finally, foreign bank lending reacts more to positive than to negative host shocks and 
is not significantly curtailed during crises.
 29  
                                                            
29 It would be interesting to consider if the Argentine crisis, which unfolded as we wrote this paper, is in line or 
might change the nature of our results.  Recent (Q1 2002) BIS data indicate almost a 35% fall in international 
private sector claims to Argentina over the previous 12 months as growth has dived and, given default, the ratings 
variable collapsed.  However, as BIS (2002) points out, a substantial part of this fall is a result of the forced 
“pessification” of local dollar lending.  The BIS data does not disaggregate the impact of this exceptional event from 
a real cancellation of claims implying that it is impossible to compare the model’s predictions with reality in this 
case.  It is also interesting to point out that, more recently, the vast majority of foreign banks (the only exceptions 22 
We conclude that while foreign banks have the potential of importing home country 
shocks and shocks from elsewhere through overall shifts in their international portfolio, on 
balance they continue to lend during crises, they have become more discriminate over time, and 
become less pro-cyclical as their exposure levels to a particular host country rise.  
 
                                                            
 
being Scotia Bank of Canada and Credit Agricole of France that were suspended) have injected new funds into their 
local affiliates consistent with the Central Bank’s assistance strategy.  
 23 
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Figure 1: 
Real lending by banks from 7 BIS-reporting countries to the private sector in Latin America
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   Source: authors’ calculation based on BIS data. 
 
Figure 2: 
Private sector claims from banks in 7 BIS -reporting countries to Latin America
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Source: authors’ calculation based on BIS data. 
 
                                                            
30 The 7 BIS lender countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, UK, and US. Latin America here refers 
to the ten largest countries in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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Figure 3: 
Private sector claims from banks in 7 BIS-reporting countries to Latin America
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              Source: authors’ calculation based on BIS data. 
 
Figure 4: 
Average share of lending from BIS 7 banks to countries in Latin America
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32 See footnote 30. 
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Figure 5: Private sector claims on Latin America
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Source: authors’ calculation based on BIS data. 
 
Figure 6: 
Private sector claims from banks in 7 BIS lenders on Latin America
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Source: authors’ calculation based on BIS data. 
 
                                                            
34 See footnote 30. 






























Table 1: Impact of crises on the growth rate of real domestic and foreign credit 
This table reports the average growth of foreign and domestic credit during tranquil and crisis periods. T-tests are 
shown for the difference in average growth between these two periods.  Tests reported are one-sided, where the null 
is: mean(tranquil period)-mean(crisis period)=0 and the alternative is: mean(tranquil)-mean(crisis)>0. BIS 7 reflects 
the growth of lending by all 7 lenders combined. Real domestic credit refers to the growth of lending by all financial 
institutions operating in the 10 host countries.  
 Claims from:  Impact of host crises  Crises in other developing countries 
   Tranquil Host crisis 
Mean t-test 
(p-value) Russian  crisis 
Mean t-test 
(p-value) Asian  crisis 
Mean t-test 
(p-value) 
BIS 7  11.14  2.05  1.95 29.57  -2.09  26.53  -1.61
         (0.03)   (0.98)    (0.95)
Canada 25.49  8.96  0.81 132.44  -2.56  64.92  -0.85
         (0.21)   (0.99)    (0.80)
France 3.19  -1.42  1.05 20.17  -2.05  13.12  -1.09
         (0.15)   (0.98)    (0.86)
Germany 14.02  4.16  1.37 25.72  -0.81  40.26  -1.71
         (0.09)   (0.79)    (0.96)
Japan 10.52  17.33  -0.61 37.01  -1.36  41.63  -1.48
         (0.73)   (0.91)    (0.93)
Spain 28.64  20.10  0.63 35.93  -0.26  77.19  -1.61
         (0.26)   (0.60)    (0.94)
UK 29.46  9.26  1.17 73.74  -1.77  24.62  0.19
         (0.12)   (0.96)    (0.43)
US 12.31  3.01  1.37 31.16  -1.58  -1.11  1.04
         (0.09)   (0.94)    (0.15)
Real domestic credit  10.67  -5.44  2.74 15.72  -0.49  17.01  -0.58
         (0.01)   (0.69)    (0.72)
 
Table 2: Comparing means and standard deviations of foreign vis-à-vis domestic credit 
This table reports the mean and standard deviation of the growth of foreign and domestic credit during the entire 
sample and during crisis periods. T-tests are shown for the difference in mean and standard deviation between BIS 7 
and domestic credit. BIS 7 reflects the growth of lending by all 7 lenders combined. Real domestic credit refers to 
the growth of lending by all financial institutions operating in the 10 host countries. 
   BIS-7 Real Claims  Real Domestic Credit  Difference Tests 










test statistic  
(p-value) 
Host Crisis  -1.13  3.16
  
2.05  20.79 -5.44  36.37
(0.13)  (0.00)
Asian Crisis  -0.86  0.14
  
26.53  30.09 17.01  11.28
(0.21)  (0.98)
Russian Crisis  -1.43  3.78
  
29.57  11.98 15.72  23.30
(0.10)  (0.05)
1985-2000  -0.76  1.65
  











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: F-tests for coefficient restrictions across home countries or lenders 
This table reports F-tests for different coefficient restrictions across home countries, based on the results presented in Table 3.  
Restricted Coefficients  Unrestricted Coefficients 
F-test of coefficient  
restrictions 
Model 4.1       
Host real GDP growth i,t-1   Home real GDP growth j,t-1   F( 96,   658) =    1.14 
Host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   Home real Interest Rate j,t-1   Prob > F =    0.1785 
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1  (Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1    
Change in host rating i,t-1   Change in private real claims on all other countries t-1    
Change in host rating i,t-1 × Exposure to i    Home dummies    
Host crisis dummy i,t-1        
Host crisis dummy i,t-1 × Exposure to i        
    Host dummies       
Model 4.2       
Host real GDP growth i,t-1   Home real GDP growth j,t-1       F(101,   658) =    1.10 
Host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   Home real Interest Rate j,t-1   Prob > F =    0.2559 
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1  Change in private real claims on all other countries t-1    
Change in host rating i,t-1   Home dummies    
Change in host rating i,t-1 × Exposure to i         
Host crisis dummy i,t-1        
Host crisis dummy i,t-1 × Exposure to i        
Host dummies       
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1       
   Model 4.3       
Host real GDP growth i,t-1   Home real GDP growth j,t-1       F(107,   658) =    1.14 
Host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   Home real Interest Rate j,t-1   Prob > F =    0.1793 
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1 Home  dummies    
Change in host rating i,t-1        
Change in host rating i,t-1 × Exposure to i         
Host crisis dummy i,t-1        
Host crisis dummy i,t-1 × Exposure to i        
Host dummies       
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1       
Change in private real claims on all other countries t-1       
Model 4.4      
Host real GDP growth i,t-1   Home real GDP growth j,t-1       F(112,   658) =    1.20 
Host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   Home dummies     Prob > F =    0.0916* 
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1       
Change in host rating i,t-1       
Change in host rating i,t-1 × Exposure to i        
Host crisis dummy i,t-1       
Host crisis dummy i,t-1 × Exposure to i       
Host dummies      
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1      
Change in private real claims on all other countries t-1      
Home real Interest Rate j,t-1        
*,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 30 
Table 5: Restricted model for the determinants of foreign bank lending to Latin America 
This table reports the estimates from the selected model according to the F-tests reported in Table 4. Model  
(5.1) presents the results for the model estimated over the period 1985-2000. Model (5.2) refers to the results  
obtained for the pre-1995 period, while model (5.3) presents the estimates for the 1995-2000 subsample. 








Host real GDP growth i,t-1   2.120 ***  2.244 ***  1.157   
   (2.900)    (2.990)    (0.730)   
Host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   -0.210 ** -0.242 ** 0.050   
   -(2.120)    -(2.340)    (0.230)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Canada  8.544 ** 1.942    -6.327   
   (2.010)    (0.550)    -(0.290)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × France  -1.759    -3.501    -1.953   
   -(0.860)    -(1.490)    -(0.380)   
Home real GDP growthj,t-1  × Germany  -2.140    -2.822    -22.063   
   -(0.840)    -(1.050)    -(1.600)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Japan  5.370 * -0.809    11.884 ** 
   (1.670)    -(0.250)    (2.460)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Spain  -4.815    -2.185    -4.579   
   -(0.720)    -(0.300)    -(0.280)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × UK  -2.928          -8.975   
   -(0.180)          -(0.510)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × US  -5.399 ** -10.331 ***  -1.623   
   -(2.200)    -(3.760)    -(0.190)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Canada  -15.551 ***  -7.299 * -6.610   
   -(3.520)    -(1.820)    -(0.400)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × France  -0.204    -1.631    -11.591 * 
   -(0.130)    -(0.410)    -(1.650)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Germany  0.468    4.859    -7.393   
   (0.170)    (1.230)    -(0.400)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  × Japan  -11.248 ** -11.576    -9.544   
   -(2.090)    -(1.010)    -(0.860)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Spain  -0.458    1.160    55.259 *** 
   -(0.180)    (0.460)    (2.660)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × UK  17.733          17.890   
   (1.070)          (0.940)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × US  -7.122 ***  -8.053 ***  1.028   
   -(2.740)    -(3.030)    (0.110)   
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.010    0.023    -0.152   
   (0.730)    (1.590)    -(1.230)   
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.393    0.768 ** -0.714   
   (1.380)    (2.150)    -(0.810)   
Change in host rating i,t-1   1.142 ** 0.062    2.279 * 
   (2.460)    (0.210)    (1.960)   
Change in host rating i,t-1 × Exposure to i    -0.093    0.029    -0.380 ** 
   -(1.490)    (0.560)    -(2.150)   
Change in private real claims on all other  countries t-1 0.146 ***  0.130 ** 0.347   
   (3.130)    (2.200)    (0.680)   
Host crisis dummy i,t-1   -3.409    -6.855    -0.639   
   -(0.640)    -(1.190)    -(0.060)   
Host crisis dummy i,t-1 × Exposure to i   0.760    0.013    0.349   
   (0.660)    (0.010)    (0.180)   
Number of observations  804    426    378   
Adjusted R-squared  0.13    0.10    0.19   
t-statistics are in parentheses (calculated on the basis of robust standard errors). *,**,*** denote  
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Home dummies are included, but not shown. UK is  
omitted in Model (5.2), because data on private sector claims is not available for the UK prior to 1993.  31 
 
 
Table 6: The impact of positive and negative shocks on foreign bank lending to Latin America 
This table presents the results from a model where the impact of host GDP changes, rating changes, and  
changes in all other claims is allowed to vary depending on the positive or negative nature of the shocks. 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Positive host real GDP growth i,t-1   1.679  1.68  * 
Negative host real GDP growth i,t-1 -2.179  -1.59     
Positive host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   -0.016  -0.13    
Negative host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   0.358  1.46    
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Canada  8.894  2.04  ** 
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × France  -2.291  -1.09    
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Germany  -2.140  -0.86    
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Japan  5.483  1.69  * 
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Spain  -5.889  -0.87    
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × UK  -1.136  -0.07    
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × US  -4.618  -1.87  * 
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Canada  -14.433  -3.14  *** 
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × France  -0.118  -0.07    
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Germany  -0.333  -0.12    
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Japan  -13.031  -2.43  ** 
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Spain  -0.110  -0.04    
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × UK  21.010  1.20    
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × US  -5.372  -1.77  * 
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.017  1.24     
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.412  1.45     
Host rating Upgrade i, t-1 1.665  1.88  * 
Host rating Downgrade i, t-1 -0.036  -0.06     
Host rating Upgrade i, t-1 × Exposure to i   -0.245  -2.53  ** 
Host rating Downgrade i, t-1 × Exposure to i   -0.117  -2.11  ** 
Increase in private real claims on all other countries t-1 0.133  2.79  *** 
Decrease in private real claims on all other countries t-1 -0.922  -1.99  ** 
Host crisis dummy i,t-1   -5.385  -0.92    
Host crisis dummy i,t-1 × Exposure to i   1.100  0.87    
         
Number of observations           804      
Adjusted R-squared  0.13       
*,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. t-statistics are obtained on the basis of  
robust standard errors.  Home dummies are included, but not shown. Growth rates and changes in ratings  
and claims are expressed in terms of absolute values. 32 
Table 7: Percentage of variance of foreign bank lending explained by home, host, and portfolio shocks 
This table reports the percentage of the variance in foreign bank lending that can be explained by home, host, and portfolio shocks. 
The percent variance explained is calculated as (R2_full - R2_constrained)/ R2_full *100. The home country variables included are  
real GDP growth, real interest rates, and the home/dollar exchange rate. Host country variables included are: real GDP growth,  
credit rating, the host/dollar exchange rate, and the crisis dummy. Positive changes refer to credit rating upgrades, host positive  
real GDP growth, and increases in all other claims. Negative changes refer to credit rating downgrades, host negative real GDP 
growth, and decreases in all other claims. We re-scale the percent of the variance explained by each set of variables so that for a  
given estimation the sum of all three groups adds to 100  
   Home Country Variables  Host Country Variables  Change in all other claims 
        
Entire Sample  46.78 31.41  21.81 
       






  1.69 4.03 
    
1985-1994  61.63 17.76  20.61 
    
1995-2000  49.56 48.59 1.85 
a We are unable to split home variables into positive and negative sub-samples since between 1985-2000 there are no periods  
when home variables take negative values. So essentially the negative/positive estimation corresponds to one where all variables 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.6: Restricted model for the determinants of foreign bank lending to Latin America, 
allowing crises to affect lending contemporaneously 
Model (A.6.1) presents the results for the model estimated over the period 1985-2000. Model (A.6.2) refers to the 











                   
Host real GDP growth i,t-1   2.014 *** 2.289 ***  1.119   
   (2.760)    (3.080)    (0.670)   
Host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   -0.209 * -0.318 ***  0.076   
   -(1.920)    -(3.080)    (0.350)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Canada  7.393 * 0.327    -7.220   
   (1.810)    (0.090)    -(0.330)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × France  -2.742    -3.576    -2.511   
   -(1.350)    -(1.550)    -(0.540)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Germany  -2.578    -3.550    -22.124 * 
   -(1.030)    -(1.270)    -(1.680)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Japan  5.413    -0.939    11.878 ** 
   (1.570)    -(0.260)    (2.450)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Spain  -4.248    -1.030    -3.163   
   -(0.610)    -(0.140)    -(0.190)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × UK  -1.983          -7.468   
   -(0.120)          -(0.420)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × US  -6.497 *** -11.851 ***  -1.333   
   -(2.630)    -(4.070)    -(0.170)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Canada  -13.977 *** -6.095 * -5.679   
   -(3.410)    -(1.670)    -(0.340)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × France  0.064    0.509    -10.930 * 
   (0.040)    (0.140)    -(1.650)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Germany  0.866    6.292    -6.595   
   (0.310)    (1.370)    -(0.360)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  × Japan -11.447 ** -12.116    -7.748   
   -(2.130)    -(1.060)    -(0.720)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × Spain  -0.208    1.165    57.405 *** 
   -(0.080)    (0.440)    (2.860)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × UK  15.890          14.301   
   (0.960)          (0.740)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × US  -6.037 ** -7.189 ***  2.733   
   -(2.290)    -(2.630)    (0.290)   
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.003    0.002    -0.002   
   (1.330)    (1.190)    -(0.250)   
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.387    0.833 ** -0.707   
   (1.370)    (2.390)    -(0.800)   
Change in host rating i,t-1   1.112 ** 0.014    2.356 ** 
   (2.390)    (0.050)    (2.100)   
Change in host rating i,t-1 × Exposure to i    -0.112 * 0.023    -0.421 ** 
   -(1.700)    (0.410)    -(2.270)   
Change in private real claims on all other  countries t-1 0.155 *** 0.141 ** 0.401   
   (3.290)    (2.400)    (0.790)   
Host crisis dummy i,t   -4.817    -3.684    -13.423   
   -(0.860)    -(0.650)    -(1.300)   
Host crisis dummy i,t × Exposure to i   1.457 * 2.705 ***  2.372   
   (1.800)    (2.910)    (1.490)   
                   
                   
Number of observations 805    420    385   
R-squared 0.1599    0.1516    0.2591   
t-statistics are in parentheses (calculated on the basis of robust standard errors). *,**,*** denote  
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Home dummies are included, but not shown. UK is  
omitted in Model (A.6.2), because data on private sector claims is not available for the UK prior to 1993.  
 37 
Table A.7: Restricted model for the determinants of foreign bank lending to Latin America, 
discriminating between banking, currency, and twin crises, 1985-2000 
   Including lagged crisis dummies  Including contemporaneous crisis dummies 
  
With Brazilian Crisis 
(1999) 
Without Brazilian Crisis 
(1999) 
With Brazilian Crisis 
(1999) 
Without Brazilian Crisis  
(1999) 
Host real GDP growth i,t-1   2.102 *** 2.107 *** 1.891 ** 1.928 ** 
   (2.830)    (2.840)    (2.400)    (2.460)   
Host real GDP growth i,t-1 × Exposure to i   -0.224 ** -0.222 ** -0.156    -0.158   
   -(2.270)    -(2.270)    -(1.270)    -(1.280)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Canada  8.417 ** 8.370 ** 8.065 * 8.082 * 
   (1.980)    (1.970)    (1.830)    (1.830)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1  × France  -1.135    -1.120    -2.368    -2.430   
   -(0.550)    -(0.540)    -(1.120)    -(1.150)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 × Germany -1.857    -1.874    -2.163    -2.231   
   -(0.730)    -(0.740)    -(0.800)    -(0.830)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1  × Japan  5.184 * 5.203 * 5.382    5.413   
   (1.680)    (1.690)    (1.620)    (1.630)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1 ×  Spain  -4.284    -4.269    -4.081    -4.123   
   -(0.630)    -(0.620)    -(0.580)    -(0.590)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1  ×  UK  -3.623    -3.207    -1.662    -1.845   
   -(0.220)    -(0.200)    -(0.100)    -(0.110)   
Home real GDP growth j,t-1  × US  -5.540 ** -5.547 ** -6.384 ** -6.356 ** 
   -(2.280)    -(2.280)    -(2.400)    -(2.400)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  × Canada  -15.124 *** -15.068 *** -15.010 *** -15.071 *** 
   -(3.380)    -(3.360)    -(3.400)    -(3.410)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  × France  0.250    0.243    0.343    0.350   
   (0.150)    (0.150)    (0.210)    (0.210)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  × Germany  0.561    0.558    1.355    1.411   
   (0.200)    (0.200)    (0.460)    (0.480)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  × Japan -10.527 ** -10.515 ** -10.536 * -10.560 ** 
   -(2.020)    -(2.020)    -(1.960)    -(1.960)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  ×  Spain  -0.146    -0.149    -0.153    -0.128   
   -(0.060)    -(0.060)    -(0.060)    -(0.050)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1  × UK 17.031    17.136    17.761    17.501   
   (1.010)    (1.010)    (1.070)    (1.050)   
Home real interest rate j,t-1 × US  -6.867 ** -6.828 ** -6.116 *** -6.186 ** 
   -(2.540)    -(2.530)    -(2.190)    -(2.210)   
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.013    0.013    -0.031    -0.032   
   (0.880)    (0.890)    -(1.300)    -(1.320)   
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) t-1 0.391    0.392    0.422    0.424   
   (1.330)    (1.330)    (1.370)    (1.370)   
Change in host rating i,t-1   1.144 ** 1.151 ** 1.089 ** 1.096 ** 
   (2.330)    (2.340)    (2.180)    (2.190)   
Change in host rating i,t-1 × Exposure to i    -0.078    -0.077    -0.125 * -0.125 * 
   -(1.200)    -(1.190)    -(1.770)    -(1.770)   
Change in private real claims on all other  
countries t-1 0.137 *** 0.137 *** 0.150 *** 0.149 *** 
   (2.940)    (2.950)    (3.200)    (3.180)   
Host banking crisis dummy  5.845    6.017    1.616    1.864   
   (0.580)    (0.600)    (0.120)    (0.140)   
Host banking crisis dummy × Exposure to i   -2.474    -2.494    5.139    5.138   
   -(0.910)    -(0.920)    (1.220)    (1.220)   
Host currency crisis dummy  -16.337 * -14.732    -10.483    -7.667   
   -(1.720)    -(1.450)    -(1.610)    -(1.130)   
Host currency crisis dummy × Exposure to i  0.841    0.565    0.763    0.639   
   (0.660)    (0.430)    (0.690)    (0.560)   
Host twin crisis dummy  -4.424    -4.174    -7.399    -7.016   
   -(0.620)    -(0.580)    -(1.220)    -(1.170)   
Host twin crisis dummy × Exposure to i   1.965    1.949    1.932 * 1.919 * 
   (1.000)    (0.990)    (1.680)    (1.670)   
                         
Number of Observations 804    804    780    780   
R-Squared 0.1662    0.1658    0.165    0.1646   
t-statistics are in parentheses (calculated on the basis of robust standard errors). *,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Business School Working Papers 
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